中文摘要：

高管薪酬的合约安排一直是公司治理中的难题。随着越来越多高管＂天价＂薪酬的披露,人们对薪酬的激励效果产生了深深的质疑。笔者以我国2008—2014年沪深两市A股主板上市公司为样本,基于委托代理理论和管理层权力理论,实证检验了高管薪酬激励的有效性。研究发现高管薪酬与公司绩效存在显著的正相关关系,这说明最优契约在我国仍具有一定的有效性。在此基础上,笔者更进一步地通过主成分分析的方法构造了＂管理层权力＂这一指标,从而对管理层权力之于高管薪酬激励效果的影响进行检验,结果显示管理层权力对高管薪酬的激励效果具有一定的抑制作用,原因可能在于高管会利用其拥有的管理层权力来影响其薪酬的制定或谋求更多的在职消费等隐性报酬。为了提高高管薪酬激励的有效性,笔者认为在完善薪酬设计的同时,还需通过诸如提高董事会的独立性等方式对高管的权力进行制衡,从而提高薪酬安排执行的有效性。本研究成果对于优化高管薪酬的合约安排具有一定的借鉴意义。

英文摘要：

The contract arrangement of Executive compensation is always the problem of corporate governance. As a growing number of executives＇ sky-high compensation＇announced,the people can＇t help but begin to suspect whether the compensation incentive still works. Set Chinese A-share main board listed companies from 2008 to 2014 as samples,based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of managerial power,this paper studied the influence of the managerial power on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. We found that there is materially positive between executive compensation and corporate performance. Furthermore,the managerial power has a certain inhibitory influence on the incentive effect of executive compensation. The reason may be that executives will use its power to influence the compensation contracts or to seek for more implicit reward such as on-the-job consumption.