财务会计信息是公司管理层与外界沟通的重要途径,作用于公司内外的一系列契约。透明度高的会计信息披露有助于缓解契约双方的信息不对称,而降低契约的交易成本。本文以2001—2007年中国A股上市公司单笔银行借款作为研究数据,对会计信息透明度在银行借款契约中是否起到作用以及起到怎样的作用进行了实证检验。研究结果显示,会计信息透明度越高,企业所获得的每笔银行借款金额越大,借款期限越长,借款利率越低。进一步的分析考虑了制度环境的影响,发现市场化水平越高、优惠政策越多、不良资产比例越低的地区,上述关系更为明显。本文首次提供了中国上市公司会计信息透明度对银行借款特征影响较为全面的经验证据。
Accounting information is very important in the communication between man- agers and outside, and affects lots of contracts of companies. Accounting transparency helps to alleviate information asymmetry, and reduce the contracts costs. Using data of bank loans of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2007, we test the function of accounting transparency in bank loan contracts. We found that the higher the accounting transparency, the more preferential policies the companies will enjoy. Companies with higher the transpar- ency may get loans with bigger sum, longer term, and lower interest. We also found that the institution environment such as market development, deregulation and ratio of impaired as- sets, affect the above relations. In areas where the institution environment is better (with high speed of market development, high degree 05 deregulation, or low ratio of impaired as- sets), the relations between accounting transparency and the features of bank loan contracts are stronger. We did several robust cheeks after main analysis, such as doing regressions using subsample of long or short loans, considering self-selection problem in bank loan infor- mation disclosure, controlling accounting conservatism and corporate governance variables. All the results of these tests are stable. This paper not only offer a comprehensive empirical results on the role of ~ceounting transparency in bank loan contracts for Chinese listed compa- nies, but also provides an important implication for the importance of accounting information under different institution environment.