中文摘要：

研究了金字塔控制结构对管理层持股与公司全要素生产率关系的影响。使用中国制造业国有上市公司的实证数据估计相应的面板数据模型，结果显示：现金流权越高，终极控制股东监督管理层的动机越强，管理层持股对公司全要素生产率的正向影响越大；终极控制权与现金流权的分离程度越小，终极控制股东越倾向获取现全流权收益，对管理层的监督也越强，增大了管理层持股对公司全要素生产率的正向影响。研究证明在金字塔控制结构下，现金流权与两权分离程度具有显著的治理效应，能改变终极控制股东的监督动机，从而影响管理层持股的激励作用。研究表明，管理层股权激励的推行必须与严格的监管相结合才能在最大程度上发挥其正向激励效应，降低其负向影响。

英文摘要：

We study the influence of pyramid control structure on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm＇ s total factor productivity. We establish a panel data model and estimate it by the empirical data of manufacturing state-owned enterprises listed in China. The results are showed as follows. The higher of cash flow right, the stronger of monitoring effect of ultimate controlling shareholders so that the positive effect of managerial ownership on productivity becomes greater. Similarly, the smaller of the separation of ultimate control and cash flow rights, the stronger monitoring effect of ultimate controlling shareholders so that the positive effect of managerial ownership on productivity becomes greater. Our research demonstrates that the cash flow right and separation of ultimate control and cash flow rights have significantly governance effect and can influence the incentive effect of managerial ownership by changing the monitoring incentive of ultimate controlling shareholders. The results indicate that only under strict supervision the stock-based incentive to managers could fully exert its positive function and has less negative effect.