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中文摘要：
以我国2010年上市公司为研究对象，从次大股东的视角研究了次大股东对公司过度投资的作用。通过实证研究发现：在绝对控股股权结构下，次大股东不能对控股股东的投资行为发挥有效的监督作用；当次大股东为机构投资者时，不能减缓公司的过度投资现象。将负债分为高低2组，在高负债率组中，次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资行为；在低负债率组中，次大股东能促进公司的过度投资行为。由此，我国上市公司的次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资，其治理作用未能发挥。
英文摘要：
Using the data of China＇s 2010 listed companies, this paper studies the role of the second lar- gest shareholding on companies＇ over-investment from the perspective of second largest shareholder, it is found that under the absolute holding ownership structure, the second largest shareholder can＇t play an effec- tive supervision role on the investment behavior of controlling shareholder; when second largest shareholder is institutional investors, they can＇t slowdown the overinvestment phenomenon; at the same time, we divided the debt into grades and found that second largest shareholder can＇t slowdown companies＇ overinvestment be- havior at high debt ratio group, while they would boost over-investment at low debt ratio group. This paper shows that second largest shareholder can＇t slowdown companies＇ over-investment, and the governance role of the second largest shareholders is not working.
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