本文利用对山东省中小商业银行机构的调查数据,考察了金融机构各种监督机制之间的替代效应。笔者分别通过构建一个线性模型和一个Probit模型来对外部董事、管理层持股、董事长/总经理两职分离、大股东和监管机构这五种监督机制的替代效应进行研究,并对这些变量作了统计分析。通过回归结果,笔者发现在两种外部监督机制之间存在显著的替代效应,内部监督机制中的外部董事比例与外部监督机制之间也存在替代效应,但是其他两个内部监督机制并没有表现出这种效应,而内部监督机制之间则存在显著的互补效应。
This paper examines the substitute effect among various corporate governance mechanisms in small-and-medium-sized financial institutions by using the survey data of SMS commercial banks in Shandong Province. The author constructs a liner model and a Probit model to analyze the substitute effect among five governance mechanisms, including outside directors, management shareholders, separation of board chairman and general manager, large shareholders and supervision institutions. The regression resuit shows that there is significant substitute effect between two external supervision mechanisms, and the substitute effects also exist between the ratio of outside directors in internal supervision mechanisms and external supervision mechanisms. However, other two internal supervision mechanisms do not have such effect, and there are significant complementary effects among internal supervision mechanisms.