中文摘要：

以2009—2014年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，基于过度投资与在职消费视角探讨了非执行董事在股东一管理层代理冲突上的治理效应。研究发现，非执行董事有助于抑制公司过度投资及管理层在职消费，非执行董事在治理股东一管理层代理冲突中发挥了良好作用。进一步的研究发现，管理层权力对非执行董事的治理效应具有负面影响。此外，基于不同产权性质的研究表明，相较于国有企业，非执行董事在非国有企业中的治理效果更为显著。

英文摘要：

Taking China＇s A-share listed companies during the period of 2009-2014 as the research samples, this paper explores the governance effects of non-executive directors on the sharehold- er-management agency conflicts from the perspective of over-investment and perquisite consumption. The results show that non-executive directors can restrain the phenomenon of overinvestment and perquisite consumption; they can play a positive role in their governance of such conflicts. Further study finds out that managerial power plays a negative role in the non-executive directors＇ governance. In addition, studies based on different property right attributes show that, compared to state-owned enterprises, the governance effect of non-executive directors in non state-owned enterprises is more significant.