利用我国沪深两市的4093个公司年非平衡面板数据,实证检查了公司产品市场竞争程度、控股股东现金股利分配倾向与公司现金股利政策之间的关系。结果表明,控股股东具有偏好现金股利的显著倾向,并且这种倾向不受股东性质的显著影响。进一步的研究发现,控股股东偏好现金股利的倾向在高产品市场竞争的环境下更加显著,控股股东要求支付更多现金股利的倾向随产品市场竞争程度的增加而增加。通过运用代理成本理论和股利“掏空”理论对结论进行分析,表明产品市场竞争起到了良好的外部治理机制作用,可以较好地抑制经理层的道德风险和控股股东通过其他方式对公司进行“掏空”。
Relationship between product market competitions, controlling shareholders cash dividend distri- bution tendency and cash dividend policy are empirically studied in this paper by taking unbalanced panel data of 4093 companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as esperiment data. The results show that controlling shareholder has a significant tendency of cash dividend distribution and the tendency is not impacted by nature of shareholders significantly. However, further studies show that the tendency is significant under the high-level of product market competition condition. The controlling shareholders tend to pay more cash dividends with the increase of product market competition. The result is explained by a- gency theory and dividend "hollowed out" theory and it implies that the product market competition plays a good role of external governance mechanism, which can effectively inhibit the moral hazard of managers and the controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviors of the other forms except dividend distribution.