中文摘要：

选取2007～2009年97家房地产上市公司为样本，以高管层在职消费分析为切人点，分析高管层权力强度、其他大股东制衡对公司高管层在职消费的影响。研究发现：（1）高管层权力越大，在职消费水平越高；（2）其他大股东制衡能力的提高能够有效抑制高管层滥用权力扩大在职消费水平；（3）国有企业高管层权力强度对在职消费的影响和非国有企业高管层权力强度对在职消费的影响无显著差异，但是其他大股东对高管层权力强度下在职消费的抑制效应在国有企业表现得更为明显。

英文摘要：

This paper empirically tests the relations between CEO power, blockholders power balance and CEO＇ s non-pecu- niary compensation using the data of real-estates＇ listed companies from 2007 to 2009. The research result shows that ： （ 1 ） CEO power is more strength, CEO＇ s non-pecuniary compensation is higher; （2）The effect of CEO power on increasing their non-pecuniary compensation could be reduced by improving blockholders＇ power balance. ; （3） The effect of CEO power on non-pecuniary compensation is no significant difference whatever in state-owned corporate or in non-stated owned corporate by analyzing ownership characterize of listed corporate, but the effect of CEO power on non-pecuniary compensation could be reduced by strengthening blockholders＇ power is stronger in state-owned corporate than in non-state owned corporate.