中文摘要：

在国有企业分类改制的背景下,文章以2009-2015年上市国有企业为样本研究内部控制质量对国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,并按公益类和商业类国有企业进行分组研究,结果表明：内部控制质量的提高对公益类国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响不显著;对商业类国有企业进行细分后发现,内部控制质量的提高对竞争型和行政垄断型国有企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响显著增强,而对自然垄断型国有企业的影响不显著。由此可见,内部控制的实施在不同类型国有企业中影响不同,内部控制并不是提高全类型国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性的良药,国有企业分类改革必须对症下药。

英文摘要：

The paper, in the context of classified reforms of SOEs, empirically studies the impact of internal control on the executive pay-performance sensitivity of SOEs using the samples of listed SOEs from 2009 to 2015, and conducts a comparative study on public-welfareSOEs and commercial SOEs. The results show that： The impact of internal control on the executive pay-performance sensitivity in public-welfare SOEs is not significant; After the further classification of commercial SOEs, the study finds that the quality of internal control canimprove the executive pay-performance sensitivity in competitive SOEs as well as the administrative monopoly SOEs, but there is no sig-nificant impact on the natural monopoly SOEs. Therefore, the implementation of internal control is different in different types of SOEs, theinternal control is not a miracle method for the improvement of executive pay-performance sensitivity of SOEs, and the different corporategovernance designs aiming at different types of SOEs should be taken seriously.