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中文摘要：
电力市场的双边竞价机制应该能够抑制市场力，增加市场的社会福利，以社会福利最大化为目标，运用Vickery-Clark-Groves原理，设计一种新的电力市场双边竞价机制，该机制在支付平衡的基础上，以各参与者对市场的福利贡献来进行市场的收益分配和结算，从理论上分析该机制的经济特征，并以西班牙电力市场的实际数据为基础，将新机制与现有的MCP机制进行实证比较分析，结果均表明新机制能够抑制拥有市场力的发电公司操纵市场报高价的行为，增加市场的成交电量，进而提高市场的社会福利。
英文摘要：
A good double electricity auction mechanism should control market power and enhance the economic welfare of the electricity market. In order to achieve this aim, the paper designs a new double auction mechanism in electricity market, using the idea of the Vickery-Clark-Groves mechanism. In the new mechanism the market participants can gain some transfer payments based on their contributions to the market welfare, and the new mechanism can balanc~ the budget of the market organizer. Then makes a theoretical analysis and gives a demonstration from the Spanish electricity market, and the results show that comparing with the MCP mechanism, the new one can reduce the bids of some generation companies with market power in faith, and enhance the economic welfare of the electricity market.
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