中文摘要：

委托代理理论认为合适的管理费设计将激励基金管理人努力工作从而使自己和基金投资人的利益最大化。但是本文利用面板数据模型的实证研究却发现我国现行的基金管理费计提方法没有起到应有的激励作用。本文的主要结论为：上一期基金管理费与本期基金净值增长率不相关；本期基金管理费＋本期基金托管费与本期基金净值增长率正相关：开放式基金管理费对基金增长率的影响比封闭式基金管理费对基金增长率影响小。

英文摘要：

Principal-agent theory argues that the appropriate management fees structure can encourage fund managers to work hard to maximize their and fund investors＇ benefits. But in this paper, the empirical study based on panel data model shows that China＇s existing fund management fees collection method can not play an incentive role. The main conclusions of this paper are： the previous fund management fees and the current fund net growth rate are not related; the current fund management fees plus the current fund trusteeship fees and the net growth rate are positively related; the effect of the open-end fund management fees on fund growth rate is smaller than that on the closed fund management fees.