欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题已经成为上市公司治理改革的焦点。从分析影响控股股东收益结构的因素出发，从上市公司独立性、股东大会有效性、中小股东权益保护、关联交易状况4个方面采用12个指标构建控股股东行为效应评价指标体系，并以中国上市公司为样本展开评价。结果显示，中国上市公司控股股东行为效应指数偏低，其行为具有引发较强负外部效应的倾向，根源在于中国现有的公司治理制度安排强化了控股股东的控制收益，激励其实施隧道行为。只有通过一系列旨在增加控股股东攫取私人收益成本的制度建设，才能抑制其行为的负外部效应，激发正外部效应。
英文摘要：
In recent years the agency problem between controlling shareholders and medium ＆ small shareholders has become the focus of corporate governance reform in listed companies. Starting from analyzing factors influencing the profit structures, this paper constructs the index system in four aspects of the independency of listed companies, the validity of shareholdes conference, the protection for medium ＆ small shareholders rights and interests, and the condition of affiliated business using 12 indexes to evaluate the controlling shareholders＇ behaviors, taking Chinese listed companies as samples. The results indicate that the index of behaviors of controlling shareholders in China is low and their behaviors bring strong negative externality. The root of this is that the controlling profit has been strengthened and the the＂ tunnel behaviours＂ have been inspirited to actualize under the current corporate governance system in China. It can be restrained only by constructing a series of systems to increase the cost of controlling shareholders ＂private profits＂.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Building Core Competencies in a Turbulent Environment: An Exploratory Study of Firm Resources and Ca
Oversea Listing, Voluntary Governance and Corporate Performance--A Case Study Based on the ‘Sinopec’
A study of fairness judgments in China, Switzerland and Canada: Do culture, being a student, and gen
期刊信息
位置：