中文摘要：

文章以国内代建制下的公共项目为研究情景，在归纳和总结项靖治理理论已有研究成果的基础上，考虑公共项目多层委托代理形成治理结构特殊性，构建出以代建人激励效应为中介变量的“项目治理机制一代建人激励效应——公共项目管理绩效”理论模型，并提出项鼠治理机制作用于公共项目管理绩效的改善路径假设。通过对147个样本数据的分析，结果表明：公共项目治理机制能够对代建人产生显著的激励效应，代建人的激励效应能够对公共项目管理绩效产生显著的影响，项目治理机制对公共项目管理绩效的直接效应较弱。表明在特定治理结构下，代建人的激励效应是项目治理机制改善公共项目管理绩效的中介变量。研究结果可为政府决策部门完善代建管理制度提供理论支撑。

英文摘要：

This paper, under the scenario of domestic public prnject agent system, generalizes existing researeh results about project governance theory. Considering the particularity of public project governance strueture formed by multi-agen- cy, it constructs a theoretical model of project governance mechanism - agent incentive - public project management per- formance＇ thal taking agent incentives as intermediary variables, and proposes the hypothesis of improvement paths on project governance mechanism acting on public project management performanee. Through 147 public project surveys, the re- suits show that public project governance mechanism can bring about significant incentive effects on agents. The incentive ef fects of agents have also eminent impacts on public project management pertormance. The direct effect of project governance mechanism on public project management performance is weaker. It also indicates that incentive effects of agents are inter- mediary variables of project governance mechanism on improvemenl of public project management performance. The resuhs provide a theoretical basis for government decision-making departments to perfect agent management system.