中文摘要：

年老的一代创业者将经营权让渡给家族成员还是职业经理人，是控股家族的重要战略决策。虽然有众多经验研究显示聘家族CEO不利于企业绩效，但现实经济中有较多公司即便是上市公司仍然雇用家族成员做CEO。为解释这种看似“无效率”的聘任安排，本文将民营企业管理职业化问题置于代际传承的背景下，将关注焦点从营利性的企业拓展到其背后的家族，从控股家族的异质性目标探索企业聘任决策的前因变量。借助多任务委托代理模型，提出控股家族非经济目标驱动下公司与CEO的匹配框架，发现更加重视非经济目标的家族倾向于提供较低激励强度的薪酬舍约，对高管的经验和能力要求较低，同时更加重视CEO的家族身份。该研究试图论证企业CEO的聘任决策内生于家族异质性目标，尝试填补家族的意愿和控制能力之间逻辑关系的理论性缺口。对家族企业聘任决策前因变量的分析，既深化了家族企业情境下的组织理论研究，也为一代创业者让渡经营权提供了决策建议。

英文摘要：

It is an important strategic succession decision to hire CEOs from family members or professional managers for the first generation entrepreneurs to handle over the management rights. A lot of studies on family business imply that CEOs who are members of the founding families underperform, but still a few family firms, even some public firms, hire the family members as CEOs in the reality. To explain the seemingly inefficiency succession decisions, this paper sets management professionalization of private firms under the background of trans-generation succession, extends the focus from profit- seeking firms to families behind the firms, and explores the antecedents of succession decisions from the perspectives of the heterogeneous goals of controlling families. According to a inulti-task principalagent model, it establishes a matching framework between companies and CEOs driven by noneconomic goals of controlling families, and finds that families that pay more attention to noneconomic goals tend to give lower-level incentive compensation contracts, require lower-degree capabilities of the CEO candidates to run the businesses and prefer the family identity of CEOs. It tries to confirm that the succession decisions of CEOs are endogenous from the heterogeneous goals of controlling families, and make up the theoretical gap of logic relationship between willingness and abilities of families. The analysis of the antecedents of succession decisions of family firms deepens the organization theory in the context of family businesses and gives some advices on succession decisions for the first generation entrepreneurs.