中文摘要：

文章以2007-2014年沪深两市非金融类A股上市公司为研究样本,基于新任CEO视角考察高管薪酬—业绩敏感性对企业创新的作用机制。发现高管薪酬—业绩敏感性上对新任CEO研发强度有显著的正面影响;但这种促进效应在民营企业中表现较弱。进一步检验职业忧虑对二者关系的影响,发现当职业忧虑水平较高时,高管薪酬—业绩敏感性对新任CEO创新投入的促进作用会减弱;但这种调节效应主要体现在民营企业,在国有企业不明显。研究结论对我国如何制定管理层薪酬契约以促进企业创新具有重要的启示意义。

英文摘要：

The paper, selecting the data of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2014 as the study samples, examines the mechanism of executive pay-performance sensitivity on corporate innovation based on the per-spective of new CEO. The study finds that executive pay-performance sensitivity has a significant positive effect on new CEO′s corporateinnovation, but the promoting effect is weaker in private enterprises. The study makes a further test on the effect of career concerns on therelationship between executive pay-performance sensitivity and new CEO′s corporate innovation, and identifies that the promoting effectof executive pay-performance sensitivity on new CEO′s corporate innovation will be weakened when the new CEO＇s career concerns arehigher in private enterprises; however, there is no above relationship in the state-owned enterprises. The study conclusions have importantimplications for China to make management compensation contract in order to promote corporate innovation.