中文摘要：

本文通过构建中央和地方关于建设用地的博弈模型，并运用1999—2009年的省级数据进行计量分析，得到以下结论：（1）中央对土地违法的查处力度是遏制地方政府超额占地的重要因素。当期查处力度对遏制超额占地非常有限，查处频率相对查处面积能够更好的起到威慑作用。各地区对土地违法案件查处反应程度不一致，土地违法的治理在东部地区能够发挥较好作用。（2）建设用地审批与区域经济增长存在长期稳定关系，误差修正模型中长期与短期系数，部分验证了在存在“保增长”指标约束条件下，地方政府具有了擅自突破国家用地审批指标的内在冲动。（3）土地财政增量对建设用地审批的增量影响显著为负，体现出短期内土地财政与廉价土地出让间的替代关系。

英文摘要：

This thesis built game model of Central-Local relationship about construction land approval and illegal land use. Data are collected from Chinese provincial level from 1999 to 2009, proving some competition behavior of local governments in the view of micro level. There are three conclusions, （1） It has confirmed that supervision from central government play an important role on protecting cultivated land and reducing illegal land use. However, only the post- supervision was significant in model, the current punishment from central government was too weak to prevent the local governments＇ excess construction land approval and illegal land use behaviors. The frequency of supervision plays more efficient than the supervision on illegal land use area. Supervision land management can play a good role in the east. （2） Economic growth had played an important role for excess construction land approval and illegal land use. There is the long-run relationship between economic growth and construction land approval. By using the error correction model, coefficients about long-term and short-term confirms that local government dominant the economic growth, which need more land resources. （3） Moreover there are substitution relationship between excess construction land approval and land finance. Increment of Land finance has significant negative impacts on increment of construction land approval, which reflect local governments＇ extensive economy growth.