中文摘要：

以2005年中国269家民营上市公司为样本，实证检验了资本结构决策中存在的终极股东代理问题。研究发现，终极股东的控制权、制衡度和现金流权与受控公司资产负债率显著负相关。这表明，在受控民营上市公司资本结构决策中，终极股东控制权比例和制衡度越高，股权融资给终极股东带来的控制权稀释风险越低，终极股东偏好股权融资；终极股东现金流权比例越低，终级股东承担的债务破产风险越小，终极股东偏好债务融资。研究结论一方面支持资本结构具有公司治理效应，另一方面证实了终极股东在资本结构决策中确实存在主动规避治理效应的动机和行为。

英文摘要：

This paper examines the agency problem during the decision of capital structure by using 269 private listed companies in China. The result shows that the controlling rights, the restriction degree and the cash flow rights of ultimate shareholder are negatively related to the capital structure. During the decision of capital structure of private listed companies, the larger the controlling rights and restriction degree of ultimate shareholders are, the lower the risk of ownership dilution is, and the ultimate shareholders prefer to ownership rather than debt ; the smaller the cash flow rights is, the lower the risk of bankruptcy is, and ultimate shareholders prefer to debt rather than ownership. On one hand, the conclusion gives support to the corporate governance effect of capital structure. On the other hand, the conclusion makes sure that the ultimate shareholders have initiatively evaded motivations and behavior of corporate governance during the course of decision-making of capital structure.