采用委托代理模型的框架,通过分析研发项目特点、外包代理方的行为特征及其信息泄漏对研发外包支付合同的影响,提出了相应的支付合同选择机制。研究表明,在无信息泄漏的情况下,当研发机构的努力程度可观测时,研发委托方可以采用固定支付合同实现外包;反之,委托方需要与代理方分享利润,并且利润分享比例与代理方的风险规避度、市场的不确定性和研发机构的开发效率负相关。在存在信息泄露的情况下,利润分享比例与研发项目对委托企业的重要性程度及其项目本身的复杂性程度负相关,并且委托方还应根据研发机构获取市场能力的不同进行调整。
This paper takes the framework of principal-agent model to analyze the influence of be- havior traits,project property and information leakage on the choice of payment contract of R&D outsourcing. The results show that without information leakage, the principal can use fixed lump-sum payment contract to select R&D agent when the efforts of the agent are observable, but should use revenue-sharing contract to undertake the R~D outsourcing when the efforts are unobservable. More- over, the sharing revenue will be negatively related to the agent's risk aversion, market uncertainty and the agent's Rg〉D efficiency. In the context of information leakage, the sharing revenue will be negatively associated to the project importance to the principal, and the complexity of the project. Al- so, the principal should adjust its revenue sharing ratio in accordance with the agent's capability of capturing the leaking market.