中文摘要：

地方官员更替代表政治权力转移,政企关系往往随之重新洗牌。本文以2006—2012年沪深两市的地方国有企业为研究样本,首次从政企关系重建的视角考察了地方主政官员更替与国有企业高管非正常变更之间的内在关系,并进一步从行业差异、继任官员来源两个角度对这一关系进行了更深层次的研究。结果发现,市委书记更替导致市委直管国有企业的高管发生非正常变更的可能性显著增加。进一步研究表明,市委书记更替对企业高管变更的影响仅显著存在于制造业和房地产业两类企业中。而且,相比来自外地的官员继任,来自本地的官员继任更可能引发企业高管的变更。本文研究还发现,由地方官员更替引致的企业高管变更会显著降低制造业企业的经营绩效,但会显著提升房地产企业的经营绩效。本文的研究不仅丰富了政治不确定性与公司治理的研究范围,还为市场各方洞悉中国国有企业的政企关系以及政治权力干预国有企业的途径与效果提供了新的视角,并为政府决策部门优化国有企业治理改革方案、制定相关配套政策提供了新的参考依据。

英文摘要：

The transfer of local officials usually reshuffles the relationship between government and enterprises. Choosing the listed SOEs in China during 2006 and 2012 as a study sample, we selected the reconstruction of government-business relations as the newest angle of view and empirically studied the impact of local officials＇ turnover to SOEs executives＇ abnormal changes, and we analyzed this influence in detail from the dimensions of industries and the last job locations of the new officials. The result showed that the probability of executives＇ changes would increase after local officials＇ turnover for those SOEs that were directed controlled by municipal people＇s government. By further testing, we found that this influence only existed in real estate industry and manufacture industry, and new officials came from another municipality showed lower influence on SOEs executives＇ changes compared to those new officials came from local political system. After a further examination, we found a decreasing market performance in manufacture firms while an increasing market performance in real estate firms after executives＇ changes caused by political turnover. Our study not only enriched the research on political uncertainty and corporate governance, but also offered an empirical support to understand how political power intervene in market operation, and supported an new reference to political decision-makers to understand the relationship between government and enterprises, and then help they to introduce some relevant laws or regulations.