中文摘要：

＂简政放权、放管结合＂是深化行政体制改革、转变政府职能的重要内容之一。＂放权＂政策体现了政府的权力分配模式从集权向分权的转变,其本质是一种＂行政性分权＂。文章从提高经济运行效率即最大化中央政府效用的视角,以建模方式——建立了一个三层次政府的动态博弈模型,给出了集权与分权的边界,揭示＂放权＂政策的逻辑,从而试图为研究政府最优行政分权提供一种可行的思路,并尝试用这一模型为＂放权＂政策提供合理的解释。模型分析结果表明,（1）分权能够在不改变社会福利水平的情况下,通过减少中央政府的信息成本负担提升了经济运行的效率,这也是＂放权＂政策的主要目的。同时,权力的下放可能导致下级政府＂寻租＂的隐患,需要加大对这一行为的惩罚力度。＂权力清单＂制度的建立,通过明确规定中间政府的权力范围,加强了对中间政府行使权力的监督,减弱了其滥用权力的动机。（2）具有以下特征的权力,分权往往比集权更优：下级政府的成本负担轻、连带惩罚力度小;权力实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度小、彼此之间相互影响程度小。与历次国发文中下放的权力做了比对后发现,这些被下放的权力能够用上述的特征进行较好的解释。（3）各因素影响分权最优性的强弱关系是：信息成本和对中间政府滥用权力的惩罚力度这两个因素强于权力本身的若干特征,即带给下级政府的成本负担、连带惩罚程度;政策实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度、外部性大小。

英文摘要：

＂Streamlining government and delegating authorities,and combining delegationregulation＂is one of the important contents of deepening the reform of the administrative system and transforming the functions of government.The policy of delegating power,reflects the transformation of the governments＇ power distribution pattern from centralization to decentralization and its essence lies in a kind of＂administrative decentralization＂.From the perspective of the improvement of economic operation efficiency,namely the maximization of the utility of the central government,this paper constructs a dynamic game mode with three-level governments by modeling,gives the boundaries of centralization and decentralization,reveals the logic of decentralization policy,thus tries to provide a feasible idea for the study of optimal administrative decentralization,and uses this model to provide reasonable explanation of decentralization policy.It arrives at the following conclusions：firstly,without changes in social welfare,decentralization can improve economic operation efficiency by reducing information costs of the central government,which is the main aim of decentralization policy;meanwhile,＂delegating power＂may give rise to the hidden trouble of rent seeking of the low-level governments,so the punishment for rent seeking needs to be strengthened;the establishment of power list system strengthens the regulation of the exercise of rights of the middle-level governments and weakens their motives for the abuse of power;secondly,in terms of power with following features,decentralization is always optimal than centralization：light burden on costs of lower-level governments and small joint punishment;when the power is implemented,the goal differences in bottom governments and mutual influences are small;after the comparison with delegated power in all previous state documents,these delegated power can be better explained by these characteristics above;thirdly,the factors affecting the optimality of decentralization are sh