本文采用20022009午提供签字会计师签名信息的公司为样本,研究签字会计师的经验、行业专长以及客户依赖对审计质量的影响。以签字会计师的签字数量和签字年限来衡量签字会计师的经验,以签字会计师对客户所在行业的签字数量来衡量行业专长,以操纵性应计来衡量审计质量。研究发现:签字会计师的角色对审计质量有不同的影响。作为项目负责人的签字会计师的经验和行业专长显著地提高了审计质量,而复核会计师的经验和行业专长与审计质量之间的关系不显著。签字会计师的经验和独立性对审计质量有不同的影响,我们的研究表明,审计师个人的经验是个人层面上决定审计质量的关键因素。在加入会计师事务所层面上影响审计质量的因素后,项目负责人的经验和应计项目依然显著地负相关;而事务所层面上,事务所的客户依赖会降低其独立性,导致应计项目显著提高。简而言之,会计师事务所层面的独立性和审计师个人层面的执业经验对审计质量有显著影响。
In this paper, we investigate how individual auditor's experience and inde- pendence affect audit quality. Individual auditors are responsible for auditing process. Previ- ous literature suggests our research question is very important. Firstly, DeFond and Francis (2005) suggest that future analysis should be narrowed down to individual auditor level for a better understanding of auditor behavior. Which level of characteristics, the individual auditor level or audit firm level, are more important still remains an open question. Secondly, al- though Chen et al. (2010) have already investigated the relationship between individual auditor's client importance and audit quality, they failed to consider the impact of individual auditor's experience on audit quality. Thirdly, current results on individual auditor's compe- tence and audit quality are mostly drawn from experimental research, few archival evidences are available. Our paper provides evidences using archival data from China. Audit reports must be audited and signed by two auditors (audit manager and audit reviewer?) as well as by an audit firm in China. In contrast, the engaged auditors are not required to sign the audit re- port in United States. Therefore, China provides a natural setting to carry out research on in- dividual auditor level due to its data availability. We use the firm-years with auditor signature between 2002 and 2009, separating audit manager from audit reviewer. We use individual auditor's prior signature number and signa- ture year to measure individual auditor's experience, use individual auditor's prior signature number in a specific industry to measure individual auditor's industry expertise, use individual auditor's client importance to measure the independence, and use discretionary accruals to measure audit quality. We find that audit manager and audit reviewer play different roles in affecting audit quality. While the audit mangers' experience and industry expertise can signifi- cantly increase