中文摘要：

由于我国证券市场发展尚未成熟，同时因为我国的特殊经济模式，监管在维护证券市场稳定发展方面起了很重要的作用。但是，由于我国监管体系的不完善，信息的不透明和不对称性会产生投机行为，中小投资者往往就成为股市博弈的牺牲品。因此，本文将通过对市场过热和市场低迷两种情况下，监管者颁布政策和中小投资者投资行为之间的博弈过程进行分析，以求规范股市投机行为，维护各方利益均衡，达到市场稳定发展。本文的分析表明监管者和中小投资者的均衡策略主要取决于其得到的效用和付出的成本，在不厨的临界值下存在不同的均衡结果。最后针对本文的结论和我国的实际情况，提出了相应的建议。

英文摘要：

Securities market is a game place for the stakeholders. To maximize one＇s own prof- it, every stakeholder will develop his own optimal strategy considering others＇ strategy. Because of the immature development of the market and the special economic mode, supervision is playing an important role in the stable development of securities market. However, due to the loopholes in the supervision system and information asymmetry, small investors always become the victims in the game. In the paper, in both situations of market overheating and market in a downturn, the game between financial regulators and small investors has been analyzed. In order to protect all the stakeholders and achieve the stable development, the equilibrium strategy is investigated and it is found that different equilibrium outcomes can be gained under different critical values. At last, according to the conclusions, some suggestions are provided.