专名问题在语言哲学和逻辑哲学研究中一直处在重要地位。专名理论通常分为摹状词理论和严格指示词理论,二者的最主要分歧在于确定专名的指称对象的方式不同。名称的描述理论认为专名在确定指称时需要通过借助摹状词,传统描述理论哲学家也意识到确定名称所借助的摹状词因人而异,这样可能会造成指称失败。而以克里普克为代表的直接指称理论认为专名是严格的指示词,描述性的反事实状况不能造成专名指称的不同。专名具有严格性。与此相伴而来的另一个问题是个体的跨界同一性问题。这两个问题的探讨都离不开对可能世界理论的理解。本文从可能世界这一概念出发,深入探讨专名的严格性问题,并从逻辑角度阐述专名严格性的必要性,最后阐述专名的严格性与个体跨界同一性问题密切相关,对专名作严格性的理解可以直接解释个体跨界同一性问题。
The problem of proper names plays an important role in the realm of linguistic philosophy and philosophy of logic.Traditional theories of names were usually divided into two kinds, descriptivist theories and rigid designator theories.The main difference between them is the different ways to determine the referent of proper names.The description theory of names points out that proper names determine the referent by means of descriptions.The philosophers of traditional descriptive theory are aware that the descriptions vary from people to people, which may lead to reference failure.And the direct reference theory represented by Kripke thinks that proper names are demonstratives.Proper names are strict.Another issue is the trans-world identity of individuals.These two problems are both in the center part of name theory and both are based on the concept of " possible world".The article discuss the rigidity of proper names and its necessity and the relationship between the rigidity and the trans-world identity of individuals based on possible world.If proper names are taken as a rigid designator, the problem of trans-world identity will be explained.