中文摘要：

管理防御理论表明,企业经理有动机追求职位稳固和高额薪酬来满足自身效用最大化。本文通过实验研究方法探寻经理货币薪酬结构对经理管理防御行为的影响机理,以期为如何通过设计有效的薪酬契约,降低经理管理防御行为所引发的代理成本,提供必要的理论支持。研究结果表明,货币薪酬结构与经理管理防御存在较强的关联性。事先给定的固定薪酬与经理管理防御水平正相关,而与业绩挂钩的浮动薪酬则与经理管理防御水平负相关。固定薪酬比重越高,经理管理防御程度就越高。在一定范围内,浮动薪酬比重越高,经理管理防御程度就越低;但超过一定范围之后,浮动薪酬比重越高,经理管理防御程度却随之增高。即浮动薪酬比重与经理管理防御水平之间呈＂U＂型关系。

英文摘要：

The theory of managerial entrenchment suggests that managers have motivations to meet utility maximization via going after a stable job and higher salary. In this paper, the influence mechanism of the monetary compensation structure on managerial entrenchment is explored through the experimental study. The necessary theoretical support is provided in order to show that how the agency cost arisen by managerial entrenchment behavior is reduced through desig- ning a more effective monetary compensation contract. The research resuhs show that there exists the strong relevance between the monetary compensation structure and managerial entrenchment. The fixed compensation given in advance is positively related to the degree of managerial entrenchment, and performance - related variable compensation is negative- ly related to the degree of manager＇s management. The higher fixed compensation proportion is, the higher degree of managerial entrenchment is. However, the higher proportion of variable compensation is, the lower degree of managerial entrenchment is in a certain range ; but the higher degree of managerial entrenchment is over a certain range. That is to say, there is a U shape relationship between the variable compensation proportion and managerial entrenchment.