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中文摘要：
为解决首次电子商务交易中因买卖双方很难完全信任对方导致的电子商务交易渠道效率降低的问题,分析了不完全信任对首次交易的影响,在不改变双方信任关系的情况下,就买方不完全信任和卖方不完全信任两种情况,分别构建保证金和预付款两种激励机制,得到了保证金和预付款的临界值,给出了两种激励机制的有效区间。研究表明,两种激励机制在不改变双方信任关系的情况下,均能有效提高交易数量、提升首次电子交易的渠道效率。
英文摘要：
In the first-time electronic transaction,the channel efficiency of electronic transaction was decreased caused by incomplete trust between buyer and seller.Aiming at this problem,the effect of incomplete trust on the first-time transaction was analyzed.The margin incentive mechanism for buyer incomplete trust and down-payment incentive mechanism for seller incomplete trust were presented respectively,and the critical margin and down-payment were obtained.The effective intervals of these two incentive mechanism were also given.The research results showed that these two kinds of incentive mechanism under no change the trust between the partners were able to increase transaction volume effectively and improve channel efficiency of the first-time electronic transaction.
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