中文摘要：

以2008-2011年中国沪市A股制造业为样本,把在职消费与政府补贴间的关系引入政企关系维护行为,并对其效率性进行探究。研究发现,维护政企关系成本越高的企业获得的政府补贴越多,且相对于非国有控股企业,该现象在国有控股企业中更为明显。在区分维护成本强度后发现,仅在维护强度高且非国有控股的企业中,其经济绩效在获得政府补贴后可以得到显著提升,即政企关系维护行为是有效率的。进一步研究发现,无论是在市场化进程较高的地区,还是在市场化进程较低的地区,政企关系维护行为均存在,但在市场化进程较低的地区更为明显。之后,对其维护成本强度进行区分,发现具有效率的政企关系维护行为仅在维护成本高且市场化进程较高地区的企业中存在。

英文摘要：

Regarding Shanghai A-share manufacturing industry from 2008 to 2011 in China as a sample, the paper draws into the maintenance behaviors from the relationship between the perquisite consumption and the government subsidies, and investigates the efficiency of maintenance behaviors. The study found that, when maintaining the political connection, there is a phenomenon that the enterprise which has the higher maintenance costs always has the more government subsidies. But relative to the non state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon is stronger in the state-owned enterprises. The further study found that, in areas with the higher market process and the lowers＇, the behaviors of maintaining the political connection exist, but it is stronger in the lower level of market process. After distinguishing strength of maintenance cost, it is also found that the effective behaviors of maintaining just exist in the enterprises which have higher maintenance costs and higher market process.