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中文摘要：
文章研究了消费者索要票据监督市场交易,税务部门给予监督者奖励,对解决弱税市场漏征漏管问题的效应.通过构建包含税收的线性经济模型,论证了消费者积极参与市场监督的必然性,对比了实施监督前后的市场和福利变化.研究发现：如果消费者索要票据的负效用很小,最优税率将有所降低,市场中提供的公共物品增多,经济体整体福利水平上升;同时,消费者监督政策还可以提高税务部门行政效率,实现不同市场消费者效用均等化;由于消费者监督效用损失影响最优参数,因此税务部门应针对行业索票难易性制定不同的征税策略.
英文摘要：
It is studied in this paper that the effect of solving the problems of weakly tax administration and tax evasion in hard-to-tax markets as consumers ask for lading bills to audit transactions and tax authority gives supervisors rewards. A Hotelling-type economy model including sales taxation is developed to demonstrate the inevitability of consumers participating actively in market supervision, and then compare changes in markets and welfare before and after the auditing. It is found that if disutility by asking for receipts is low, the optimal tax rate will be reduced, and government increases the provision of public goods all the market, so as to promote economy welfare level. Consumer auditing can also realize the utility equalization across markets. As utility cost affects the optimal parameters, tax authority should set different tax policies aimed at requesting difficulties in various industries.
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