中文摘要：

超市食品安全的政府监管主体经历了从多头监管到单一监管的转变，实现了食品安全监管职能与产业管制职能的分离。政府与超市的行为博弈模型说明，通过打击超市经营不安全食品的非法收益和增加赔偿额与处罚力度，有利于提高政府的监管效果。运用FV—RC矩阵对278个食品安全事件的实证研究表明：加工食品出现的食品安全问题最多：食品添加剂过量和致病性微生物超标是引发食品安全问题的主要因素；食品添加剂使用不当是食品安全的重要隐患。加强超市食品安全监管，应实施奖惩相容机制，抓住关键监管点，协调食品安全监管职能与产业管制职能。

英文摘要：

The government supervision department for supermarkets＇ food safety has undergone a transformation from co-supervision to single-supervision, and realized the separation of the functions between food safety supervision and industry supervision. The behavioral game model between the government and supermarket shows that hitting the illegal benefit gained by supermarkets＇ operating unsafe food and strengthening the compensation and punishment degree is in favor of improving supervision effect. The empirical study of 278 food safety incidents using the FV-RC Matrix illustrates that processed agricultural products have the most problems. Excessive food additives and pathogenic microorganisms are the main contributors inducing food safety problem. Inappropriate usage of food addictives becomes the hidden danger of food safety. Strengthening the supermarket food safety supervision should carry out incentive compatible mechanism, seize the key points and coordinate food safety supervision function and industry regulation function.