中文摘要：

笔者针对由一个生产商和一个零售商组成的二层供应链，分别在生产商Stackelberg、纵向纳什、零售商Stackelberg三种渠道权力结构下，分析了参与方的利他偏好对供应链均衡决策的影响作用，得出了如下结论。（1）从效用角度衡量，利他偏好确实总能够“利他”，但未必“利己”；只有在双方纵向纳什结构时，才能确定实现“利他利己”；而当市场为Leader-Follower结构，只有当主导者利他倾向高于一定程度时，才可以实现“利他利己”；反之，则会“利他损己”。（2）从利润和效用两个指标来看，利他倾向实现了“双重利他”，但未必利己；在纵向纳什结构下，生产商和零售商的利他偏好系数满足相应的条件时能够同时达成“双重利他利己”，实现帕累托改进，获得生产商、零售商和顾客“多赢”的最佳结局；而当供应链中仅一方具有利他偏好时，利他偏好具有“利他胜过利己”的特点。在此基础上，笔者通过数值分析对结论进行了验证和说明。

英文摘要：

Considering a dyadic supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, this paper studies the influence mechanism of the channel partners＇ altruism preferences on the equilibrium results in three channel scenarios, Manufacturer Stackelberg, Vertical Nash and Retail Stackelberg. We find several meaningful results. （1） When measured by utility, the altruism preference of one party will always benefit the opposite party, but not necessarily benefits himself. Only under the Vertical Nash structure, the altruism preferences can benefit both parties. If the supply chain is under the Leader-Follower structure, the altruism concern will be in conducive to both parties only when the leader＇s altruism preference is more than a certain extent. Otherwise, it will benefits opposite and hurts oneself. （2） When measured by both utility and profit, one party＇s altruism preference always benefits the other party, but it is not always true for himself. Second, under the Vertical Nash structure, the altruism preferences can benefit two parties when they meet certain conditions respectively. Then the Pareto improvement reaches and everyone wins. Third, when only one party in the supply chain has the altruistic preferences , it will benefit the other party more than himself. In the end, a numerical example is presented to verify and illustrate the above results.