中文摘要：

在标准Hotelling模型框架下建立了双边市场的Stackelberg价格博弈模型,通过假定用户在完全信息时形成积极响应的预期,在缺乏信息时形成消极性的预期,研究了用户信息对非对称竞争的双边平台利润的影响。研究结果表明：在均衡存在的条件下,当后定价平台的所有用户都完全信息时,用户信息会随着交叉网络外部性的增加而对先定价平台利润依次产生倒＂U＂型和正＂U＂型影响;当后定价平台的所有用户都缺乏信息时,用户信息会随着交叉网络外部性的增加而对先定价平台利润依次产生倒单调正、单调负和正＂U＂型影响;而无论先定价平台所有用户是完全信息或缺乏信息,用户信息对后定价平台利润都会产生负向影响。

英文摘要：

We construct the Stackelberg pricing game model of two-sided market based on Hotelling framework and study the effects of user ＇s information to profits of two-sided platforms with asymmetric competition based on the assumption that the users form responsive expectations if they are informed and form passive expectation if they are uniformed. Firstly,the effects of user＇s information to profit of first-pricing platform are successively inverted U and U shape as the strength of cross-group network externality is growing if the users of second-pricing platform are all informed. Secondly,the effects of user＇s information to profit of first-pricing platform are successively monotonic positive,monotonic negative and U shape as the strength of cross-group network externality is growing if the users of second-pricing platform are all uninformed. Thirdly,the effect of user＇s information to profit of second-pricing platform is monotonic negative regardless the users of first-pricing platform are all inform or uninformed. Lastly,the results all above are based on the conditions that all of the equilibriums are existent.