本文采用试验研究方法,模拟价值链节点企业交易过程,研究了信任与激励两种价值链成本治理机制的治理效果以及它们之间的作用关系。试验结果显示,高度信任与基于价值链利益的激励机制均可以有效缓解或防范合作问题、协调问题和侵占问题,对价值链成本治理具有明显的治理效果。当价值链节点企业之间缺乏信任的时候,激励机制会失去效用;信任机制与激励机制之间具有显著的互补关系。
As competitive advantage's important origin,the value chain are complex systems of value added activities which cover entire process including purchases raw material from the spare part supplier to the producer production final product,and sends the final product to the customer's hand,and attracts the domestic and foreign scholar's attention day by day.Managing buyer-supplier has received considerable interest among decision;however the enterprises on the value chain are the independent benefit body.And the value chain cost government has the interdependence,mutual influence characteristic.Uncertainties in a dyadic require an appropriate governance structure for flexible adaptation to changing circumstances.This situation had some issues on the process of value chain cost government,such as the opportunism tendency,inconsistent goal,property special-purpose,and so on.This has caused three major problems on the value chain cost government,which are cooperation question,coordination problem and appropriation problem.And it will restrict the value chain cost government efficiency.The overcome or the solution degree on three major problems is the key of promoting the value chain cost government efficiency.Simulating the transaction process across firms in a value chain,this paper presents an experimental study on the separate and jointly governance effect of trust and stimulus on the cost of value chain.The experimental result reveals that high level of trust between firms and the stimulus based on the jointly interests of value chain can effectively mitigate or avoid the cooperation question,coordination and appropriation problems,thus have significant governance effects on the cost of value chain.Stimulus is out of effect when much lower level of trust across firms exists and based on sole enterprise interests.The research reflects that there is a significant complementary relationship between trust and stimulus mechanisms.