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An Improved Fitness Evaluation Mechanism with Memory in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Regular Lattices
  • ISSN号:0253-6102
  • 期刊名称:《理论物理通讯:英文版》
  • 分类:TP333.1[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构;自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]Tianjin Key Laboratory for Control Theory and Complicated Industry Systems, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China, [2]School'of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China, [3]Key Laboratory of Computer Vision and System (Ministry of Education), Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
  • 相关基金:Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61203138, 60904063; Innovation Fund for Technology Based Firms in Tianjin
中文摘要:

深深地在自然、社会、节俭的系统理解合作的出现,我们在场有在空间囚犯常规格子上的窘境游戏的存储器的改进健康评估机制。在我们的模型,单个健康周围由在当前的比赛的发薪,而且由在以前的圆箱的发薪是不仅坚定的。一个悦耳的参数,作为存储器力量称为() ,它躺在 0 和 1 之间,被介绍进模型在单个健康计算调整电流和以前的游戏回合的发薪的比率。什么时候 = 0,我们的模型被归结为标准囚犯的窘境比赛;当时 1 代表的 = 发薪是的在盒子完全由起始的策略并且这样决定它远离现实主义的。广泛的数字模拟显示记忆效果罐头实质地支持合作的进化。为 < 1,越强壮记忆效果,越 higher 合作水平,而是 = 1 导致合作,而是罐头的一个病理学的状态部分在大诱惑参数提高合作。当前的结果意义大让我们在自私播放器之中在合作的进化期间说明存储器效果的角色。

英文摘要:

To deeply understand the emergence of cooperation in natural, social and economical systems, we present an improved fitness evaluation mechanism with memory in spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices. In our model, the individual fitness is not only determined by the payoff in the current game round, but also by the payoffs in previous round bins. A tunable parameter, termed as the memory strength (μ), which lies between 0 and 1, is introduced into the model to regulate the ratio of payoffs of current and previous game rounds in the individual fitness calculation. When μ = 0, our model is reduced to the standard prisoner's dilemma game; while μ = 1 represents the case in which the payoff is totally determined by the initial strategies and thus it is far from the realistic ones. Extensive numerical simulations indicate that the memory effect can substantially promote the evolution of cooperation. For μ〈 1, the stronger the memory effect, the higher the cooperation level, but μ= 1 leads to a pathological state of cooperation, but can partially enhance the cooperation in the very large temptation parameter. The current results are of great significance for us to account for the role of memory effect during the evolution of cooperation among selfish players.

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期刊信息
  • 《理论物理通讯:英文版》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:中国科学院
  • 主办单位:中科院理论物理所 中国物理学会
  • 主编:孙昌浦
  • 地址:北京2735邮政信箱 中国科学院理论物理研究所编辑部
  • 邮编:100190
  • 邮箱:ctp@itp.ac.cn
  • 电话:010-62551495 62541813 62550630
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:0253-6102
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-2592/O3
  • 邮发代号:
  • 获奖情况:
  • 首届国家期刊奖,中国科学院优秀期刊特别奖,国家期刊奖百种重点期刊,中国期刊方阵“双高”期刊
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  • 俄罗斯文摘杂志,美国化学文摘(网络版),美国数学评论(网络版),德国数学文摘,荷兰文摘与引文数据库,美国剑桥科学文摘,美国科学引文索引(扩展库),英国科学文摘数据库,日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国科技核心期刊
  • 被引量:342