中文摘要：

基于2007年至2011年中国上市公司的经验数据，探讨企业关系型交易对管理层机会主义行为的影响。实证结果表明：供应商或客户关系型交易比例越高，投资效率越低，这会加剧投资过度或投资不足程度，说明供应商或客户关系型交易在带来关系租金的同时也会带来一系列负面效应；上市公司的内部控制质量越好，越有助于抑制关系型交易带来的非效率投资，说明内部控制作为一种可置信承诺，能够有效抑制机会主义行为、控制和降低风险，提高信息披露的可信度，缓解信息不对称，从而抑制关系交易引发的投资不足或投资过度行为。

英文摘要：

Based on the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2011, this paper investigates the effect of relationship-specific transaction on the managerial opportunism behavior. The empirical study indicates that relationship-specific transaction in terms of supplier and customer is negatively related to investment efficiency, which will increase overinvestment and underinvestment. The relationship-specific transaction will lead to rent, but at the same time brings about a series of negative effects. Further studies show that the negative relationship between relationship-specific transaction and investment efficiency will decline with the development of internal control. What＇s more, research shows that high quality internal control, as a credible commitment, can effectively suppress opportunism behavior, control and reduce risk, improve the information disclosure credibility, alleviate information asymmetry, thus inhibiting the underinvestment or overinvestment triggered by relationship-specific transaction.