中文摘要：

通过资源基础理论，从动态能力的视角，研究政治联系对管理者离职现象的影响，揭示了中国企业如何动态地、长期地运用政治资源。研究发现：首先，如果继任者具有政治联系，其前任高管更可能被解聘。但是，从长期看，随着政治资源被公司开发和利用，具有政治联系的高管将面临着更高的离职几率。其次，当具有政治联系的高管离职后，继任者往往也具有政治联系。最后，利用中国中小上市公司的数据，验证了研究的假设。

英文摘要：

This paper investigates the impact of political ties on top managers＇ turnover from a combination of re-source based view and dynamic capabilities. It uncovers how firms manage their political ties in the emerging mar-kets of China, from a dynamic perspective. The main findings are that, firstly, the incumbent manager faces a higher dismissal rate when his or her successor has political ties. However, in the long run, managers who have political ties encountered higher dismissal rates when their political ties had been fully exploited. Finally, after the dismissal of managers with political ties, the successor always is a person with political ties. Employing the data of small and middle size enterprises （SMEs） in the listed market of China, our hypotheses are supported.