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中文摘要：
信用是涉及至少两个行为方的一种约定关系，约定的遵守意味着信用的建立。在具有交互性的行为中，策略选择或均衡的不确定性会促使各行为方建立约定，实施一种确定的策略选择，以确保他们不陷入最糟糕的境地。有些行为方有违反约定的反悔行为，以便使策略选择从一种均衡走向另一种均衡，提高自己的收益。违约现象的出现会影响到社会信用的建构。在反反悔机制下，意欲反悔者无法实施其反悔行为，行为各方均按照约定行事，社会信用能够得以维系、建构。
英文摘要：
Credit is convention concerned with at least two agents, and keeping convention means the establishment of credit. When faced with an interactive action, agents will establish convention in order that one of equilibriums can be definitely chosen and that they are not in the worst situation if uncertainty related with at least two equilibri- ums occurs. Some agents may improve their benefit through changing equilibrium under breaking convention which is called regret. Breaking convention may impede or impact the construction of social credit. Under anti-regret mechanism, the person who wants to break the convention cannot get his object because other agents will keep the convention, thus social credit can be consolidated and then be constructed.
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