中文摘要：

本文在考虑公平偏好信息非对称下研究需求依赖努力的批发价格契约对零供博弈和供应链的影响。研究发现：当零售商为完全理性类型时,信息对称下的努力水平低于非对称情形,当零售商为公平偏好类型时,信息对称下的努力水平高于非对称情形;当零售商的公平偏好强度足够大或者当零售商完全理性且信息非对称时,零售商利润会超过处于先动优势的供应商利润;无论公平偏好信息是否对称,批发价格契约不能消除但能缓减“双重边际问题”且起到供应链利润分配机制的作用。本研究对现有供应链契约研究的某些理论分析进行了完善,并修改了某些研究结论。

英文摘要：

Considering the information asymmetry of fair preference, this paper studies the effects of wholesale price contract on supplier-retailer game and supply chain coordination where the market demand is dependent on the effort. This study proves that when retailer is fully rational, the retailer＇s effort in symmetric information is lower than that in asymmetric ease, but the effort comparison is opposite when the retailer cares about fairness; if retailer＇s fairness is intense enough or when the retailer is fully rational and the fairness information is asymmetric, retailer＇s profit will exceed supplier＇s; whether fairness information is symmetric or not, wholesale price contract can＇t eliminate but can alleviate the ＂double marginalization problem＂ and take the role of fair mechanism in the supply chain profit distribution. Besides, this study improved some theoretical analyses of existing supply chain contract and modified some research conclusions.