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中文摘要：
<正> Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent WrightFisherprocess.We consider symmetric 2x2 games in a well-mixed population.In our model,two parameters todescribe the level of player’s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced.In contrast with the fixationprobability method that used in a noiseless case,the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the processan ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process,we can analysis the evolutionary stablestrategy (ESS) of the games.We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner’sdilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG).We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicatordynamics in infinite size populations.The results are determined by simulation experiments.
英文摘要：
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
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