中文摘要：

文章基于创业企业股权众筹融资的特征与流程,分析了众筹平台作为投融资中介在融资过程中的风险防范策略,借鉴Casamatta等的模型,构建了创业企业和领投人、跟投人的三方委托代理模型,给出了三者的参与条件与激励约束,并得到股权众筹融资下创业企业的最优权益分配比例及其影响因素与众筹平台的风险防范策略。研究结果表明,创业企业通过股权众筹融资能够更好实现对企业的控制,同时吸引更多大众投资者参与融资活动;众筹平台通过收取交易费用可以督促创业企业更有效的努力,减少企业与投资人的道德风险,为大众创业提供良好平台。

英文摘要：

The paper,based on the features and process of equity-based crowdfunding of venture enterprises,analyzes the riskprevention strategies for the crowdfunding platform as an investment and financing agency in the process of financing. The paperalso uses Casamatta＇s model for reference to construct the principal-agent model between venture enterprises,lead investors andfollow investors,and gives the optimal allocation proportion of venture enterprises and its influencing factors under equity-basedcrowdfunding financing as well as the risk prevention strategies for the crowdfunding platform through the analysis of their par-ticipation conditions and incentive constraints. The results show that venture enterprises can achieve better corporate control whileattracting more investors to participate in public financing through equity-based crowdfunding financing. The crowdfunding platformcan supervise venture enterprises to work more effectively and reduce the moral hazard of enterprises and investors by chargingtransaction fees,so as to provide a good platform for mass entrepreneurship.