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中文摘要：
股东在面对具有行为偏差的经理时，如何设计剩余收益作为激励指标，以促使双方的目标一致，一直是学界和实务界关注的一个问题。如果股东继续沿用传统的基于公司资本成本率计算得到的剩余收益，将使得损失厌恶的经理投资不足，过度自信的经理投资过度。为了改进投资决策，股东需要针对不同行为特征类型的经理设计较公司资本成本率更低或更高的激励相容资本成本率，以有效激励经理做出符合股东利益的投资决策。
英文摘要：
In this paper, the behavior bias of the management such as loss aversion and overconfidence are eonsidered in the principal-agent model, and we find out that traditional RI based on the firm＇s cost of capital will induce under-investment if a manager displays loss-aversion, and will induce over-investment if a manager is optimistic. Our model illustrates that in order to eliminate the underinvestment and over-investment and achieve the goal-congruence between the shareholder and the manager, the incentive compatible cost of capital should be set to be lower than its true value for the loss-averse manager while for the optimistie manager, the incentive eompatible cost of capital should be higher than its true value. This conclusion improves the traditional theory about the residual income.
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