中文摘要：

建立了由一个制造商和两个零售商组成的两级供应链,在市场价格竞争下,下游零售商创新投入降低运作成本的供应链博弈模型。研究发现,分散决策下,制造商的利润随着零售商创新能力和竞争强度的提高而增大,其最优批发价与零售商的创新能力无关,创新投入的外溢效应反映在增加了制造商的需求。创新使零售商的利润提高,但由于竞争性,当创新能力达到一定程度后,创新反而使零售商的利润降低。为此,提出了使供应链协作的基于数量折扣的混合契约,最后利用具体算例分析验证了结论。

英文摘要：

A supply chain game model about retailers＇ innovation investment to reduce operation cost was constructed, which consisted of one manufacturer and two competitive heterogeneous retailers and was demand sensitive to prices. Research showed that in the decentralized decision model, the manufacturer＇s profits would increase with the retailers＇ innovative ability and competitiveness. Retailers＇ innovative ability had no relationship with the manufacturer＇s optimal wholesale pricing, and their vertical externality within the channel consisted in enhancing the demand of the manufacturer. Innovative investment increased the retailers＇ profits at the beginning. When their innovation ability was high enough, the innovative investment decreased their profits owing to their competition. Finally, a compound contract of supply chain coordination based on quantity-discount schedule was proposed and the numerical examples were provided to verify the conclusions.