中文摘要：

当前恐怖袭击活动由偶发的单次攻击发展为不同地域内连续发动袭击.考虑政府部门统筹反恐设施选址和应急资源调度,构建了连续恐怖袭击下反恐设施选址优化与反恐资源调度优化的斯塔克伯格博弈模型,并分析政府与恐怖分子的均衡行为.结合新疆喀什地区重要城市反恐设施网络结构的实例,数值分析得出了选址点个数、袭击次数、是否考虑反恐资源调度等因素对政府与恐怖分子最优效用的影响;最优反恐资源投入量与袭击次数和选址点个数之间的关系.研究表明：反恐资源最优投入量、反恐设施选址点个数和政府应急管理能力三者具有替代关系;政府反恐力量联合考虑反恐设施优化选址和反恐资源优化调度的实施效果更好.

英文摘要：

Terrorist attacks are moving from the occasional single attack to the continuous attacks on different regions.Considering government departments coordinate anti-terrorist facilities location and emergency resource scheduling problems,the paper constructs the Stackelberg game model of anti-terrorism facility allocation and resources scheduling under the condition of continuous terrorist attacks,and then analyzes the equilibrium behaviors between government anti-terrorist forces and terrorists.According to the anti-terrorist facilities network case of Kashi area in Xinjiang,the numerical example is adopted to show the effects of the number of anti-terrorist facility location,attack times,and the anti-terrorist resource scheduling on the governments and terrorists’ maximal expected utilities.The alternative relationship is discussed among the number of anti-terrorist facility location,attack times,and the optimal input of anti-terrorist resource.The result shows that there is the alternative relationship among the number of anti-terrorist facility location,government emergency ability,and the optimal input of anti-terrorist resource.There has the better implementation effect when government anti-terrorist forces simultaneously consider the anti-terrorism facility location and resource scheduling problems.