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中文摘要：
为满足次级用户随时接入频谱的需求,避免次级用户谎报边际估值、到达时间和离开时间的行为,将认知无线电网络中一个频谱经纪人和多个次级用户之间的动态频谱分配问题建模为一个多单位在线拍卖,并提出了一种在线频谱拍卖机制.结果表明,机制不仅能在完全未知将来投标序列的情况下,立即对当前投标做出是否分配频谱的决策,而且满足激励相容性和个体理性,同时,在无干扰的用户之间支持频谱的空间复用性,实现了公平有效的频谱分配.最后,通过实例验证了该机制的实用性和可行性.
英文摘要：
In order to deal with secondary users＇ requests as they access spectrum at any time, and discourage secondary users from cheating in their bids, arrival time and departure time, the dynamic spectrum allocation problem is modeled as a multi-unit online auction, which considers the cognitive radio network with one spectrum agent and multiple secondary users. And then, an online spectrum auction mechanism is proposed. The results show that the mechanism has three properties. Firstly, the mechanism can decide whether to allocate spectrums to a secondary user immediately as its bid is revealed without knowledge of bids that will arrive subsequently. Secondly, the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Thirdly, the mechanism supports spatial reuse of spectrum and realizes a fair and efficient spectrum allocation. Finally, a numerical exarnple is given to show the feasible and practicability of the mechanism.
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