中文摘要：

董事政治关联对于公司价值的影响一直是学者们关注的重要问题。中组部2013年10月30日发布了《关于进一步规范党政干部在企业兼职（任职）问题的意见》（以下简称“18号文”），禁止现任及尚未办理离职手续的政府官员在企业兼职任职。基于此，本文以2013年10月30日-2014年10月30日期间我国股市所有辞职董事为样本，研究了董事政治关联等级与公司价值的关系，以及该关系受到的董事来源地特征的影响。本文发现：（1）董事政治关联等级越高，辞职引发的公司价值的下跌程度越显著；（2）考虑辞职董事来源地特征后发现，异地董事、京城董事或者异地且京城的董事辞职后，其政治关联等级对公司价值下跌的影响更显著。进一步分析表明，“18号文”公布时也有显著的市场反应，表现为聘有政治关联董事的公司价值下跌更明显。本文研究表明，聘任政治关联等级较高的董事，特别是异地或权力中心的董事，是公司建立政治联系、影响公司价值的重要途径。

英文摘要：

On Oct 30, 2013, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in China issued No. 18 Document to ban government officials taking any positions at Chinese firms. Based on this background, we employ all resigned directors of Chinese stock markets from Oct 30, 2013 to Oct 30, 2014 as the sample to explore the correlation between directors＇ rank of political connections and firm value, and how does this correlation been affected by characteristics of directors＇ location. We find that the higher the rank of politi- cally connected directors, the more significant the firm value drops; moreover, the ranks of political con- nections of non-local directors, Peking directors and both exert more significant influence on the decreasing of firm value after the resignation announcement; additionally, around the issue of No. 18 Document, the value of politically connected firms drop more than that of non-politically connected firms; firms with high- er political connections lose more value than that of firms with lower political ties. Our study suggests that seeking directors with higher political rank, especially non-local directors or directors from power center, is a vital channel that the firm constructs political connections.