中文摘要：

复杂不透明的避税交易为公司高管的自利行为提供了机会。国企高管薪酬激励扭曲程度较大，所握权力缺乏监督，当他们从显性薪酬契约中获得的货币性私有收益较低时，可以通过避税交易寻租，此时国有上市公司避税程度较大；国有上市公司与子公司、受同一母公司控制的其他公司发生的异常关联交易、以及对异常经营活动现金流的操纵是国企高管避税寻租的实现途径。但是，“四大”审计并不能对高管避税寻租产生治理作用。

英文摘要：

Complex and opaque tax avolclance transactions prowue opportunities for high-rank-ing managers＇ opportunistic behaviors. The incentive distortion degree of State-owned enterprises high-ranking managers is higher than those of Non-SOEs because their compensation are regula- ted. High-ranking managers of SOEs like to seek hidden benefits and the companies＇ tax avoid- ance degree is high when they gain low monetary benefits from remuneration contracts. Abnor- mal related party transactions and real earnings managements through abnormal operating cash flow aggravate the relation between monetary benefits and tax avoidance. But, the ＂Big 4＂ audi- tors do not inhibit the rent-seeking through tax avoidance.