中文摘要：

通过对上市公司关联担保与股权结构以及公司治理的研究发现，作为第一大股东私人收益一种方式的关联担保与大股东持股比例呈负向关系，且独立董事和其他大股东对第一大股东的关联担保有监督和制衡作用，董事会的会议频率对关联担保不具有监督作用。可见，加强董事会的治理能使第一大股东的私人收益行为得以抑制。

英文摘要：

Based on the related guarantee, the ownership structure and the corporate governance of the listed companies, we found that, as the biggest shareholder is a way of personal income, related guarantee and the shareholding ratio has a negative relation, independent directors and other big shareholders have supervision and restriction to the biggest shareholder＇s association, the frequency of the board meeting has no supervision to guarantee. So strengthening the management of the board of directors can limit the behaviors of private of the first largest share holder.