中文摘要：

投资者情绪通过迎合渠道影响公司投资的隐含前提是高管利益与资本市场股价密切相关。笔者结合高管薪酬结构中对股价较为敏感的高管持股以及股权激励计划中授予高管的股票期权,并考虑权益激励相对强度,研究权益激励对高管迎合行为的影响。研究发现,高管持股比例与股权激励计划中是否授予股票期权,并不显著影响迎合作用的发挥,而高管持股激励强度对迎合行为存在显著为正的调节作用,这种调节作用在高成长性公司表现更为显著。最后,基于上述分析,分别对上市公司股权激励计划设计、薪酬结构制度安排以及证券投资者非理性行为规范提出相应的政策建议,以尽量降低投资者情绪及其与权益激励交互作用对公司投资效率产生的不利影响。

英文摘要：

An implied premise of how investor sentiment affects corporate investment by catering channel is the benefits of executives closely related to the share price of the capital market. Combining the executives’ shareholdings and stocks or options vested in stock incentive plan which are more sensitive to stock price in executives’ compensation structure,and considering the relative intensity of equity-based incentive,the paper studies the effects of equity-based incentive on executives’ catering action. It finds that the shareholdings and stocks or options vested in stock incentive plan don’t affect the role of catering significantly, while the executives’ shareholdings incentive intensity has significantly positive moderating effects on catering,especially in high growth corporation. Finally,based on the analysis above,the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the designing of stock incentive plan of listed company,the institutional arrangement of compensation structure and the regulation of the irrational behavior of the security investors,in order to reduce the adverse impacts of investor sentiment and its interaction with equity-based incentive on corporate investment efficiency.