中文摘要：

针对两制造商和单零售商组成的供应链,假定产品存在次品需返修、产品需求为随机且受到产品质量和零售商促销努力的影响,用均衡分析方法建立了零售商为风险中性时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,给出了协调供应链的回购加促销补贴合同.并基于条件风险值准则建立了零售商为风险厌恶者时的供应链集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,给出了协调该供应链的回购加促销补贴合同.研究表明：当风险厌恶因子等于1时,零售商为风险厌恶者时的供应链决策与零售商风险中性时的情况一致；最后的算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性；零售商越厌恶风险,其订货量越少,制造商、零售商和供应链的收益都将下降；而产品正品率的提高有利于供应链各方.

英文摘要：

Consider one supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer with the random demand dependent on product quality due to the inferior products and retailer＇ s sale promotion. Firstly, the centralized and decentralized decision models were set up respectively by using the equilibrium method when the retailer was risk- neutral. A buy-back plus promotion subsidy contract was put forward to coordinate the supply chain. Secondly, the centralized and decentralized decision models based on CVaR criterion were set up, respectively, when the retailer was risk-averse, together with a buy-back plus promotion subsidy contract to coordinate this supply chain. The study revealed that when the risk-averse factor equals to one,the decisions of supply chain with risk-averse retailer were i- dentical to those with risk-neutral retailer. Final example demonstrates the reasonability of the proposed models and feasibility of the coordinative contracts. It showed that the more risk-averse retailer was, the less order quantities are, which leads to lower profits of manufacturer, retailer and whole supply chain. Yet the enhancement of product＇s rate benefits all agents. qualified