中文摘要：

定增并购为探讨定向增发的驱动因素或利益输送提供了新线索，但定增折价与并购溢价的相关性不仅为利益输送提供更加隐秘的通道，同时也会导致市场评价的错位。本文以大股东是否参与为背景，对定增并购价格要素进行检验发现：大股东的参与是评价其价格偏离是否涉嫌利益输送的重要条件；从整体上看，价格偏离并非利益输送的绝对证据；定增折价率系大股东支持的代理变量，能够有效提升内部资本配置效率；但大股东未参与下的并购溢价率与利益输送显著正相关；进一步观察发现，定增并购主体关联性是价格偏移的关键诱因。由此既验证了“定增折价治理假说”，同时也为定增并购的科学决策与全要素监管提供经验支持。

英文摘要：

Although the private placement and acquisitions has provided new evidence to explore the interest transferring in the process of non-public offering, the private-placement discount and M＆A premium which are related closely provide some lecret channels for interest transferring, which may reduce the effectiveness of the evaluation. So based on the participation of big shareholders, this paper tests the economic consequences of the private placement discount rate and M＆A premium rate empirically using the data from 2006-2013. Then we find thatthe big shareholder participation is an important premise for evaluating. In terms of the price, dual-prices deviation is not the evidence of interest transferring. The high directional private placement discount rate has been accepted by the market which could increase the efficiency of capital allocation effectively by reducing the agency cost and relieving information asymmetry, while acquisition premium rate has a positive relationship with interest transferring under major shareholders＇ participation. What＇s more, the object correlation is the key to price distortion. Based on the paper, we can provide some empirical evidences for the reasonable decision making and regulation.