中文摘要：

在金字塔控股结构下,以中国制造业上市公司2007~2013年的数据为样本,检验不同类型的终极股东对上市公司的利益侵占行为,以及不同类型的债务融资工具在侵占行为中的调节作用。结果表明：中央及地方政府控股股东对上市公司有支持行为,家族控股股东对上市公司有侵占行为;商业信用削弱了中央政府控股股东的支持行为,银行债务和公司债券削弱了地方政府控股股东的支持行为,银行债务和商业信用加剧了家族控股股东的侵占行为。

英文摘要：

Based on the pyramid shareholding structure, and the data of listed companies in manufacturing industry in China from 2007 to 2013, the paper examines the benefit expropriation behavior of different types of ultimate shareholders, and the moderating effect of different types of debt financing instruments in controlling expropriation behaviors. The results indicate： the central government and the local government controlling shareholders have support behaviors on the listed companies, while family Controlling shareholders have expropriation behaviors on the listed compa- nies. Commercial credit weakens the supporting behavior of central government controlling share- holders, the supporting behaviors of local government controlling shareholders are weakened by bank debt and corporate debt, and the expropriation behavior of family controlling shareholders is aggravated by bank debt and commercial credit.