中文摘要：

本文基于消费者的“0-1”购买特征和产品的纵向差异化特征，建立了一个新的价格战模型。通过应用数学证明和数值模拟的方法发现：（1）合谋体系、背叛体系以及价格战体系的均衡结果均与需求冲击无关；（2）差异化产品厂商的背叛动机以及产品链条的合谋稳定性也与需求冲击无关；（3）产品的差异化程度是影响合谋稳定性的重要因素，差异化程度越大，合谋越稳定；（4）合谋集团对背叛厂商的惩罚策略存在着“误伤效应”，这种效应在一定条件下能够自我抑制，表现为产品链条上的价格战和合谋共存，在其他条件下，这种效应不能自我抑制，价格战一旦发动就会迅速扩散到整个产品链条。

英文摘要：

This paper puts forward with a new price war model based on characteristics of durable goods purchase and vertical product differentiation. It finds that ： （ 1 ） demand impact has no effect upon equilibrium results of collusion scenario, defection scenario or price war scenario; （2） neither firm＇ s incentive to defect nor the stability of collusion is influenced by demand impact ; （ 3 ） the extent to which products differentiate plays an important role in maintaining stability of collusion, and the more differentiated the more stable; （4） an ＂accidental injure effect＂ would occur under punishment strategy of collusion coalitions, which leads to diverse phenomena of price wars. Under certain conditions, price war can be self restrained and coexist with collusion. Otherwise, price war will extend quickly to the entire product chain.